a patient he assumes "a duty of care," and in law he will be expected to attain the standard of a reasonably skilful and careful member of his profession. Most cases will be judged on their own merits. For instance, a consultant practising in his own speciality wvill be held liable for negligence in respect of treatment which in a general practitioner or a junior member of the profession might be regarded as quite satisfactory; his standards must be those of a reasonably skilful and careful consultant.
It also seems fairly definite that all doctors, and particularly those who specialise, will be expected to keep abreast of modern developments and new techniques.
It is unlikely that any one of us will be liable if damage could have been averted only after reading a particular article in a medical journal, but we would be expected to know, for example, if a drug or clinical method had been tried out and found to carry special dangers or disadvantages. We are, of course, entitled to adopt our own methods of treatment even if they do not meet with universal approval, so long as they are approved by a substantial proportion of Certain changes have recently been made in the law concerning the liability of hospitals for their medical staffs. Before the Health Service Act was passed it was generally accepted that the only duty undertaken by the governors of public hospitals towards a patient was to use due care in selecting their medical staffs. The relationship of master and servant did not exist between the governors and the physicians and surgeons who gave their services at the hospitals. Nurses and others when assisting at operations ceased for the time being to be the servants of the governors; they took their orders during that period from the surgeon alone, and only very occasionally was a nurse held liable for anything which went wrong. This principle was established as long ago as 1909 in a case which involved St. Bartholomew's Hospital.2
More recently there has been quite a marked change in this aspect of the law, and the first milestone was probably the case of Gold v. Essex County Council in 1942.3 In this case a competent radiographer was found to have been professionally negligent. He was at the time a whole-time employee of the hospital, and the management committee, as his employers, were held to be liable for his negligence even when he was engaged on work which involved the exercise of professional skill.
This decision was extended in 1951 to apply also to doctors and surgeons.4 It was held that liability must depend on who employs the doctor or surgeon. If the patient himself selects or employs the doctor or surgeon the hospital authority cannot be held liable for his negligence because he is not employed by it. But where the doctor or surgeon, be he a consultant or not, is employed and paid not by the patient but by the hospital authority, then the authoritv may be liable for his negligence in treating the patient.
There is certainly no longer any question that the employing authority is responsible for the acts of their resident medical staff. But so far as part-time consultants are concerned there is probably still an element of doubt about the position; it is possible that some distinction will still be drawn, as it was in the past, between contracts for service (i.e., consultants) and contracts of service (i.e., house officers). However, the trend of legal decision recently seems to indicate quite clearly that the doctrine of vicarious responsibility5 (responsibility delegated by the employing authority) will also be applied to consultants, whether part-time or whole-time. It is interesting to note how the attitude of the Ministry of Health in London has already changed. About 1952 Regional Boards were instructed by the Ministry not to undertake the legal defence of any member of their medical staffs involved in a legal action. If it seemed likely that a hospital would be involved in the alleged negligence of a doctor the Boards were advised to bring the doctor into the action in order to obtain a contribution from him in respect of any damages awarded. Two years later the Medical Defence Union, in concert with other protection societies and the British Medical Association, were able to reach agreement with the Ministry and so bring the system to an end. In a recent report6 the Medical Defence Union say that this has been a great step forward because it has resulted in a more frequent presentation of a united front by hospital authorities and the protection societies; and that it has gone some way towards eliminating the feeling that lay administrators seem more concerned with "passing the buck" or in settling out of court than in contesting unjustifiable claims. The obvious danger in this arrangement, to which attention was drawn at the time, is that in cases where the hospital authority alone is sued and the conduct of the defence left to the authority the interests of the medical men concerned may be insufficiently considered. So far, however, the Medical Defence Union feel that this has not happened.
Another possible consequence which still causes a good deal of concern in Scotland (where the law is slightly different) is that if a court rules that a consultant is the "servant" of the hospital authority, this may lead to various undesirable sequelxe such as the issue of clinical directives. In fact, what the courts have so far held is that we are "agents" or "delegates" but not servants. Furthermore, it seems that these words have little exact meaning in law and contain no implication of any power to dictate on clinical matters. Indeed, in one of the judgements7 made about three years ago it was stated quite clearly that, in the view of the court, ijt is not open to a hospital authority to do any such thing, even if it were so desired.
CONSENT FOR OPERATION. In gynxcological practice it is not uncommon to be confronted by a patient requesting sterilisation. There seems little doubt that if there is a good medical indication the matter is simple, because it is akin to therapeutic abortion. But if the sole reason is that the couple wish to avoid having anly more children the legality of sterilisation is much more doubtful. Karminski anid Reeve8 state that they are aware of no authority to support the view that it is illegal provided the usual safeguards of written consent from both husband and wife are obtained. On the other hanid, just a few years ago the medical protection societies9 thought it advisable to obtain a fresh opinion from counsel on the matter, and this was given to the effect that sterilisation on eugenic grounds alone is illegal, and I suspect that this would include purely social and domestic issues also; it is not so if there are valid therapeutic reasons and a second opinion is obtained. Some of us at one time or another, when faced by a husband adamant that his wife should be sterilised, may have taken refuge in the time-honoured suggestion that it would be much easier if he were sterilised. This approach to the problem will sometimes have its salutary effect, but in fact sterilisation of the husband is of very doubtful legality even when supported by the full consent of both parties concerned unless it is performed for some specific indication such as insanity.
Perhaps the most difficult decisions relating to consent are those which arise during laparotomy, often quite unexpectedly. We may well wonder to what extent we are free to use our discretion regarding the removal of tubes, ovaries, and the uterus, and to what extent the usual consent form signed before laparotomy gives us complete carte-blanche to do what seems best. Before the days of the Health Service it may have been quite reasonable to believe that if a patient came to hospital either on her doctor's advice or on her own initiative she was deemed to agree to receive treatment, but unfortunately this cannot be said to hold good in law today.10 Consent must be "full, free, and valid in all respects." To secure it we must make known to the patient what we propose to do and what the possible consequences are-often no easy matter to put into words. There is at least one interesting example of the type of legal tangle in which we can find ourselves unless we are very carefulll:-This was the case of a patient on whom a bilateral oophorectomy was performed. She alleged that she had expressly forbidden the removal of both ovaries, although she had consented to the removal of one of them. The case was in the end contested successfully, but not so very easily, on the grounds that the operation had been left to the gyniecologist's discretion, based on the results of exploration; that the double oophorectomy was necessary in order to prolong the patient's life, if not to enable her to escape imminent danger; and that the cause of tier sterility was not the operation but the cystic condition of the ovaries at and preceding operation.
Legal opinion stresses the importance of having a clear statement that the scope of the operation will be left to the discretion of the surgeon after he has gained full information. The subject is dealt with in some detail by Taylor,12 who goes so far as to state that if a surgeon finds he must exceed the limits of pre-operative permission he should consult with the nearest relative or else be able to rely on the extreme necessity of the case before proceeding. As always, the value of a second opinion is emphasised. In our Ulster provincial hospitals another gynccological opinion is seldom less than thirty miles away; when in doubt I 27 have had the greatest help from our consultant anxsthetists and as onlookers who see perhaps most of the surgical game one can scarcely doubt that their opinions would count as much in law as in every-day practice.
Biopsy DIAGNOS I S.
It is surprising to find little reference in writings on the subject of negligence to the support which I believe we can also get from our pathologists. While in Canada recently I was impressed by the emphasis placed on the routine pathological examination of all tissues removed at operation; indeed it was an absolute rule in most hospitals. There is no doubt that some of this insistence came from "Tissue Committees" intent on reducing unnecessary surgery, but there was a medico-legal motive as well. TIhe taking of vaginal smears for cytological examination as a matter of "office routine" was also stressed as being a sensible precaution because it seems that the stage has now been reached in some parts of the U.S.A. at which, if an early uterine cancer is missed, failure to have taken a smear can be construed as negligence.
Failure to take a biopsy has, of course, been the subject of litigation in England, and it is interesting to recall the details of two such cases13:
One of these concerned a hysterectomy performed by a wonman gynxcologist, the patient being a doctor. Some time after the operation the patient's marriage broke up and she attributed this to the hysterectomy which she claimed had been unnecessary. It seems that the gynxcologist had carried out diagnostic curettage, considered the endometrium on macroscopic examination to be malignant, and had proceeded with the hysterectomy. Subsequent histological examination showed that the endometrium was not in fact malignant. The gynecologist eventually won the case. She contended that her colleague had asked her to use her discretion and proceed with hysterectomy if the curettings appeared suspicious, rather than subject her to a second anzsthetic.
The other case is also well known. An American businessman, while in England in 1942, developed acute urinary retention. The surgeon, after opening the bladder, found, on careful manual and visual examination, what he concluded was an inoperable prostatic cancer. The patient was told the exact diagnosis so that he could return to America and settle his affairs. There it was found that the mass in question was not malignant, and it was in fact removed successfully.
An action was brought for negligence, one of the grounds being the surgeon's failure to take a specimen of the presumed carcinoma for biopsy. Mr. Justice Birkett held that the surgeon had been negligent in not making a microscopical examination, and that he had been lacking in his duty in taking no step to check or verify his diagnosis. Judgement was entered against the surgeon for the sum of £6,300. On appeal, Mr. Justice Askwith held that a doctor was not liable in negligence by reason only that he made a mistake in diagnosis. The surgeon had maintained that his failure to take a biopsy had been a deliberate decision after prolonged thought, that to have taken a biopsy would have carried some risk, and that what he had done had been in accordance with established medical practice. He was cleared completely of negligence and no damages were awarded; but we should perhaps remember that this case was heard sixteen years ago and it might now be much more difficult to substantiate failure to take a biopsy from any organ if there were the slightest suspicion that it might be malignant.
While preparing this address I frequently felt I was very much the amateur trying to interpret the work of professionals; my object has been to stimulate your interest without, I trust, giving the impression that I am in any way an
